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T
he provision of legitimate and accessible 
justice for its citizens is one of the 
fundamental duties of a well-governed 
state. But throughout Africa the 
institutions of state justice are struggling 
to overcome problems of overload and delay, 
perceptions of corruption and popular distrust. 
Current policy prescriptions to improve access to 
justice are dominated by the belief that non-state, 
customary or informal ‘alternative dispute resolution’ 
(ADR) systems provide the best solutions. But 
research by Africa Power and Politics (APPP) in 
Ghana challenges this new orthodoxy. The findings 
suggest that the state can and does provide 
ADR-type accessible justice at local level that aligns 
with popular beliefs and expectations. The key 
lessons from the Ghana experience are that:
 ● Both formal justice and ADR need to be 
provided by institutions that can guarantee 
fair and impartial mediation at low cost with 
enforceable settlements
 ● The state can provide such forms of justice when 
it combines the authority and professionalism 
of a national institution with the informality of 
procedures as delivered by local officials   
 ● Neo-traditional dispute resolution is not necessarily 
the most legitimate or popular solution.
State vs. non-state justice: the 
search for alternatives
State justice in Africa is frequently criticised by 
commentators as exclusionary because it is too 
formal, based on ‘alien’ (i.e. colonial) concepts and 
too expensive. In some countries, the main problems 
are delay and enormous backlogs of cases; in others, 
there is politicisation of justice where administrative 
officials such as Prefects are the main sources of 
dispute resolution.2 In more fragile, post conflict 
states the justice system has often lost all legitimacy 
or is perceived as hopelessly corrupt.3
Policy responses to this litany of problems have 
included a variety of reform initiatives to improve 
access to justice. The idea that state institutions 
should start to offer ADR or consensual mediation has 
gathered wide acceptance, together with experiments 
with paralegals and the revival of customary forms of 
justice. In Uganda and Mozambique, the state supports 
‘popular’ justice through elected local courts. 
The most powerful trend in the development policy 
literature, however, is to argue that state institutions 
are so flawed and irrelevant that legitimate and 
effective justice is to be found mainly in non-state 
social institutions such as traditional chiefs, religious 
or community leaders and families. According to one 
commentator, even if the state was able to fully and 
correctly apply state law, it would ‘not meet the needs 
and demands of users’.4 This argument is based on 
two main assertions:
 ● that non-state institutions are by definition ‘infor-
mal’ and rooted primarily in African traditions that 
are supposed to privilege restorative justice and 
social harmony. They are, therefore, inherently 
more effective and in tune with popular beliefs 
and expectations
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2 ● that non-state dispute settlement institutions 
(DSIs) are in practice the most popular, and deal 
with ‘80% of all disputes’.5
The evidence from APPP research in Ghana chal-
lenges such assertions, particularly the characterisa-
tion of popular beliefs about justice, the assumption 
that so-called customary institutions necessarily offer 
‘informal’ ADR and are more popular, and the asser-
tion that the state cannot offer informal and acces-
sible kinds of dispute resolution.
ADR, state justice and popular 
values in Ghana
 
Since the late 1990s the Ghanaian government has 
been supporting the expansion of ADR and more 
informal kinds of justice, both in the state’s first 
instance Magistrate’s Courts through a programme 
of court-connected ADR, and in two new institutions 
outside the Judicial Service: 
 ● the Commission on Human Rights and Ad-
ministrative Justice (CHRAJ), which offers 
ADR-type mediation of complaints in its 109 Dis-
trict or Regional Offices 
 ● the neo-traditional Customary Land Secretariats 
(CLSs), based on traditional chieftaincy authorities. 
These were set up by Ghana’s Ministry of Lands 
with substantial donor support and are empowered 
to settle disputes arising over the ownership and 
demarcation of land held under customary tenure 
(80% of all lands).   
APPP research compared the performance of the 
Magistrate’s Courts (including the new ADR service), 
with that of the CHRAJ and the CLSs, focusing 
on civil cases – particularly land, inheritance and 
property, family matters, debt and landlord-tenant 
relations. Drawing on six months of ethnographic 
observation of hearings, a representative survey 
of 800 respondents and interviews with disputants, 
the findings cover three dimensions of performance: 
legitimacy, accessibility and effectiveness.
Legitimacy
Legitimacy was defined as the extent to which 
the procedures and codes of justice used by 
the dispute settlement institutions corresponded 
with citizens’ values about what makes a dispute 
settlement fair and morally acceptable. One of 
the most significant findings of the research was 
the discovery that most ordinary Ghanaians see 
justice as essentially a ‘balanced process’ through 
which the truth is brought out, and the parties 
acknowledge fault (see Table 1). Both the CHRAJ 
and the Magistrate’s Courts were rated as highly 
congruent with these popular beliefs. The CLSs 
scored less well because of their more formal and 
hierarchical procedures. 
Accessibility
The CHRAJ mediations scored very highly, 
offering a free, informal process run by full-time, 
professionally committed and trained officials. 
Nationally, nearly 60% of all complaints concerned 
women’s and children’s rights. In the Districts 
studied, complainants were mainly younger, less 
well-educated women seeking maintenance for 
themselves or children, compensation for domestic 
violence, or (in Northern Ghana) escape from 
forced marriage. Although CHRAJ mediators were 
always mindful of the need to uphold the legal 
rights of women and children, they generally sought 
to achieve mutually acceptable compromises, 
especially where the rights of children had 
to be balanced against those of women, or 
compensation was the main remedy sought (see 
Box). Magistrates also performed relatively well 
because of their informality, use of local languages 
and variety of codes including customary law and 
cultural principles such as respect for the elderly. 
CLSs, however, were regarded as intimidating to 
women and migrants and 70% of the litigants were 
older, higher status men.
Effectiveness
CHRAJ also scored highly on this dimension 
because of the speed and cheapness of their 
procedures, although lack of legal enforceability 
was perceived as a weakness. The Magistrates 
Box: A CHRAJ domestic violence case
A young woman complained that her ex-partner had 
assaulted her while she was pregnant, causing a miscarriage 
that led to a prolapsed womb. The man was persuaded 
to accept responsibility for the cost of drugs, although not 
for the costs of any gynaecological operation. There was 
no reference to the police, although the man was made 
aware that an action for damages in court would have 
resulted in much larger damages. The woman was 
reluctant to go to court, but was able to access some 
compensation quickly and cheaply albeit at the cost of 
forgoing her full legal rights.
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3were undermined by the long delays and costs 
associated with legal proceedings, which often 
took many years. The sheer volume of cases filed 
in the courts means the number of cases pending 
continues to grow year on year. And court-
connected ADR was unable to expand its very 
limited coverage because of lack of funds to recruit 
sufficient numbers of full-time, trained mediators. 
Nevertheless, the attraction of enforceable legal 
remedies meant that 54% of litigants felt it had 
been ‘definitely worthwhile’ bringing their case to 
court. And 53% of litigants had taken their case 
straight to court without even trying an informal 
dispute settlement first.
CLSs were cheaper and speedier than the Magistrates 
but were dependent on the personal authority of the 
chief and could be delayed by lengthy consultations 
amongst chiefs, community representatives and 
state land sector agencies.6
Table 1: Popular concepts of justice: what 
makes a dispute settlement ‘fair’? (N=800)7
% of  
respondents 
Establishing truth through due process 36.1 
Impartial/honest judge or arbitrator 14.8 
Other qualities of judge (competent, firm, 
God-fearing)
16.8 
Chief, elders involved, community 
expectations respected
9.3 
Mutual acceptance of verdict, 
reconciliation
14.2 
Fault identified, law enforced 5.2 
Efficiency issues (delay, cost etc) 1.0
Don’t know 2.7 
Policies to promote more 
accessible justice in Africa: 
lessons from Ghana
Ghana is acknowledged as one of Africa’s more 
stable multi-party democracies with strong state 
institutions and party traditions. And the power, 
wealth and political status of traditional authority in 
Ghana is very high compared to other African states, 
with the exceptions, perhaps, of northern Nigeria 
and central Uganda. But the institutionalisation of 
the legal profession and the common law courts 
over a period of more than 100 years is shared by 
most of the ex-British countries to varying degrees, 
again with Ghana and Anglophone West Africa 
ranking highest on this dimension. And Ghana 
is not alone in its commitment to constitutional 
democracy. These characteristics suggest that 
Ghana’s experiences do have real relevance to 
other countries provided the comparisons are 
treated with due caution. Three main sets of policy 
implications may be identified. 
Developing ‘hybrid’ state institutions
Any policy to provide more accessible justice 
through ADR, or other informal kinds of dispute 
resolution, must guarantee fair and impartial 
mediation that combines a user-friendly informality 
with the authority to uphold agreements. This is 
especially important for vulnerable people such as 
abused women who need compensation payments 
or other agreed arrangements to be assured. Where 
state institutions are sufficiently strong they can 
provide such guarantees, because they have the 
national structures within which standards can be 
regulated and professional training and commitment 
sustained. Policy should, therefore, focus on 
developing ‘hybrid’ institutions that can combine 
the legal authority and enforceable remedies of the 
formal system with more informal procedures for 
delivering justice, including ADR. 
Making justice reflect real local values
Encouraging ADR is clearly an effective policy for 
promoting more accessible and effective justice. 
But any successful ADR scheme must reflect 
local values and expectations about how to settle 
disputes fairly. It should not be assumed, without 
empirical investigation, that popular beliefs about 
justice are based on what is often loosely called 
‘customary’ or neo-traditional institutions inherited 
from the colonial period. There is little evidence 
that popular values in Ghana corresponded to 
the ‘African’ stereotype of restorative justice and 
community-sanctioned reconciliation. In other 
countries where the former colonial chieftaincy 
systems have been much weakened, the gap could 
be even greater. 
Ghana’s 
experiences do 
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to other countries 
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comparisons are 
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Taking critiques of traditional  
institutions seriously
It is very important not to romanticise the notions of 
restorative justice and social harmony that have been 
attributed to traditional institutions. Many scholars 
argue that such codes have, in practice, served to 
reproduce local elite dominance, dispossession of 
the poor, and discrimination against women and low 
status groups, particularly in Anglophone countries 
where superior chiefs were part of the formal colonial 
governmental system.8 These problems need to be 
taken more seriously by policy makers. 
Justice institutions based on the chieftaincy are 
usually so embedded in local power structures 
and formal protocols that it is not certain that 
they can offer genuine ADR, particularly for land 
disputes. It is recommended that informal justice 
that is genuinely accessible and impartial is best 
offered by state-supported, modern paralegal-
type institutions, for which Ghana’s CHRAJ can 
serve as an excellent model.  The formal courts 
can also provide such a service whilst retaining 
the essential function of offering remedies based 
on legal rights. 
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